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ABSTRACT PAGE

This localized study of privateering and piracy in C harleston, S outh Carolina b etw een 1720
an d 1755 offers an interpretation of th e s e activities a s an extension of a growing d isco n n ect
betw een th e colonial residents and th e vice adm iralty court. In th e w ake of earlier pirate
crises, local officials ban d ed to g eth er with th e imperial authorities to p ro secu te offenders and
p a s s restrictive legislation. W hen that relationship deteriorated, colonial officials turned a blind
e y e to re sid e n ts violating declaration an d condem nation laws. T h e se actions, illegal u n d er th e
law but perm itted by local governm ent, indicate th e em e rg e n c e of a legal grey zo n e an d a
d iscrep an cy b etw een the authority v ested by th e Crown and th e authority a s recognized by th e
colonists. P e rh a p s even m ore im portant th an the new found quasi-legal supply of hard
currency to th e ca sh -strap p e d colony w a s th e tension surrounding com peting authorities a s th e
C h arleston m erch an t and planter bloc drifted further, socially and politically, from th e C row n's
ap pointed officials.
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Introduction: The Politics of Plunder

On June 22, 1745, three South Carolina men gathered to draft a deed of gift.
An indentured servant-tumed-privateer summoned a local justice of the peace and a
lawyer to help him exchange plunder for his freedom. The justice sealed the
document, the mistress emerged richer in coin, and the indentured entrepreneur was a
free man.
These exchanges were common in Charleston during the 1740s. Their legality
was at best ambiguous. All three parties’ actions could have been called into question
by imperial authority. Had the servant followed proper procedure in declaring the
plunder? The answer, certainly not. Was the mistress remiss in accepting the
plunder? According to the law, yes. Did the justice have the authority to seal and
declare the gift valid? This question has no clear answer, and it perhaps the most
interesting.
A historian making the case for increased scrutiny of historical crime declared
that “because crime is a behavioral phenomenon which comes to the historian’s
attention only after proscription and prosecution, the history of crime is not simply
social history but an important component of legal history.”1 But what of crime that is
not so easily defined, behavior considered illegal by some and socially acceptable by
others? When this type of action occurs in a place and time where law is in flux, can it
be considered a crime?
1 Robert P. Weiss, ed., Social History o f Crime, Policing, and Punishment. (Famham: Ashgate
Publishing, 1999), 309.
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These three men chose to follow a common law, a social precedent of legality
set not by legislation but by the inaction of local officials in prosecuting their
transgression. Secure in their agreement, they put it forth in a legal document, which
made its way from a justice of the peace’s ledger to a folder at the South Carolina
Department of Archives and History. Historians now have evidence of their “crime”,
and it is more a political phenomenon than a behavioral one.
The history of maritime activity, and especially its illegal element, cannot be
fixed in a time or space. As a result, it is difficult to explain, understand, and even
contextualize maritime crime and piracy. Efforts to bring piracy into the discussion of
the Atlantic World broadly take two forms. One group of scholars treats piracy as an
interesting anomaly and focuses on the so-called Golden Age of Piracy, which lasted
from 1650 to 1720 with an especially virulent upswing in activity in the last decade in
the Caribbean, along the North American coast, and across the Atlantic to West Africa
and the Barbary Coast. Conflict between England, France, Spain, Portugal, and
Holland led to a great number of privateers operating in the Atlantic; when the powers
achieved peace and revoked the letters of marque, many of the privateers continued to
run their operations despite their illegality. With peacetime came unemployment for
naval men, and the skilled sailors proved attractive recruits for pirate crews. These
historians portray piracy as a phenomenon embedded in international conflict, a side
effect of the struggle for supremacy.2

2 The following three works are useful in their attention to the rise o f piracy in an international context.
Peter R. Galvin, Patterns o f Pillage: A Geography o f Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America,
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The second approach to the study of pirates in this time period focuses on the
social history of mariners and their trade. This vein of scholarship, advanced recently
by Marcus Rediker, suggests an image of the pirate crew as an amalgam of
downtrodden, oppressed people which function as a proletariat through piracy. The
pirate ship provided a refuge where men with low socioeconomic mobility could
achieve influence, and the democratically-run pirate crews stood in opposition to
imperial, aristocratic rule. While these works provide a much-needed societal
contextualization of piracy, the focus on the internal dynamics of the crew comes at
the expense of the larger effect of near-continuous piracy in the Atlantic. Both
approaches ignore post-Golden Age piracy and the era’s impact on the colonial
response to privateering and piracy.3
Both groups of scholars view piracy as a reaction to larger social and political
forces, a critical component to understanding the trends of when, where, and why
piracy occurred. Whether the pirate is a privateer gone rogue or a protester, he (and it
is always a he, save for a few unusual instances) is committing an illegal act. The
post-Golden Age period complicates the question of legality, and the very definition of
crime.

1536-1718 (New York: Peter Land, 1990); Mark Gillies Hanna, The Pirate Nest: The impact o f piracy
on Newport, Rhode Island and Charles Town, South Carolina, 1670—1730. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University, 2006, esp. ch. 8; Mark Quintanilla, "The World o f Alexander Campbell: An EighteenthCentury Grenadian Planter," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 35, no. 2
(Summer, 2003): 229-256.
3 Stephen D. Behrendt, David Eltis, and David Richardson, "The Costs o f Coercion: African Agency in
the Pre-Modem Atlantic World." The Economic History Review 54, no. 3 (Aug., 2001): 454-476, esp.
460-64; Linda Colley, "Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations and Empire." Past and
Present no. 168 (Aug., 2000): 170-193.
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A major issue in the historical examination of piracy is periodization. Scholars
focusing on the Golden Age end their studies in the 1720s, while those interested in
piracy in the context of international war are bounded by the dates of the conflict.
Piracy, privateering, and especially the role of booty in legal proceedings and in the
economic sphere require a continuum of study. Many of the social and legal changes
which facilitated piratical activity in the 1740s began during the Golden Age and
shifted in favor of the rogue seamen over the course of the interwar decades. Finally,
officials’ tolerance of overtly or subtly illegal maritime activity depended on public
opinion. The political and social climate of Charleston at midcentury is most
revealing when compared to the preceding decades. In looking at piracy, privateering,
and public opinion over the first half of the eighteenth century in Charleston, a story of
political competition between local officials, the vice admiralty court, and the alleged
criminals emerges.
Robert C. Ritchie identified two types of piracy within the English empire.
Officially sanctioned piracy “comprises acts that are clearly piratical under any system
of law but that go unpunished because a particular government finds it convenient to
ignore such activities”, while commercial piracy is either associated with merchants or
“with communities that practiced piracy as a major economic enterprise.”4 The latter
definition clearly applies to Charleston. This paper will demonstrate that the first
definition is also applicable, because the relevant “particular government” is the local
administration, and not the imperial satellite vice admiralty court.
4 Robert C. Ritchie, Captain K idd and the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986),! 1, 17.
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This paper is divided into two sections. The first deals with the Charleston
colonists’ public opinion of the government and its relationship with privateering and
piracy between 1680 and 1725, when tensions between local and imperial authority
were put aside in favor of collaboration against the pirates.

Continuing anxiety over

economic and social instability, ineffectual government and an inadequate legal
system provide the context for the second section, an examination of why and how
plunder trade opened again in Charleston after the 1720s crackdown, and the reasons
for increased local support of plunder in defiance of the vice admiralty court.
Economic, legal, and social pressures developed in parallel fashion between 1720 and
1755, which in turn fueled outwardly oppositional attitudes of Charleston residents
toward the vice admiralty. By 1740, pirates were no longer the enemy, and behavior
which sparked outrage and vigilantism in the 1710s was deemed necessary for the
economic survival of the colony.
When public sentiment and English law and its enforcement arm diverged, a
legal grey zone invited enterprising colonists to use the disjointed system to their
political and economic advantage. What the vice admiralty court considered a crime,
colonial officials called legal, and the Charleston residents called everyday business.

6

Chapter One: Fear, Power, and the Legacy of the Golden Age in Charleston

(

Privateering and piracy, for all of the strongly-worded laws governing them by
England, were not adjudicated uniformly in terms of the practice of law. Even when
mariners engaged in obvious illegal activity, social circumstances often saved them
from the gallows. In the North American colonies, English authorities and colonial
officials tolerated piracy when the seamen also acted as paramilitary units against
foreign powers or delivered rare goods, and openly supported privateering against
enemies in times of war. Some colonial officials also consciously ignored the
formation of pirates’ nests in port cities and looked the other way as pirates and
citizens brokered trade of undeclared plunder. When the populace supported the
pirates’ work, most were safe to continue extralegal business.5
Their safety depended on both general support from the public and either an
overt or implicit acceptance by the crown. The judgments of the two entities could
align in the pirates’ favor or diverge to dangerous repercussions. A change in public
opinion proved problematic for the pirates at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
In the years leading up to the crackdown in the 1720s, colonists grew concerned that
piracy, and associated maritime instability, threatened shipping and the development
of the coastal economy. The administrators were forced into action in a more extreme
fashion than before. Officials had to create economic and legal incentives for
townspeople to break ties with the pirates, and apply social pressures to bring in the
5 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 146-151; Marcus Rediker, Villains o f All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the
Golden Age (London: Verso, 2004), 28-29.
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pirates themselves. When the popular and legal opinions reflected each other, colonial
officials could carry out effective anticrime schemes. But even once the legality of
piracy was no longer in flux, the authorities and residents of South Carolina still had to
navigate the complicated relationship between their political system, a new economic
system, and the multiple definitions of crime in play.
The colony of South Carolina had a particularly tumultuous relationship with
pirates, due in part to a rocky political foundation and troubling economic conditions
in its early years. South Carolina, in contrast to its immediate northern Chesapeake
neighbors or southern sugar-producing Caribbean islands, floundered quickly under a
failing proprietorship less than two decades after its inception. One scholar noted that
“the Carolina proprietors in the early 1680’s confronted the problem of a colony that
returned neither profits nor obedience to its owners.”6 The colonists in turn were
skeptical of the proprietors’ ability to manage the colony. Colonial policy suffered the
effects of internal factionalism between pro-proprietary English and Scots immigrants
and anti-proprietary Barbadian transplants. Colonists and investors alike were
continually worried by the lack of steady profit.
Tensions between England and Spain boiled over in 1686 with an invasion of
troops into the Carolinas from Spanish Florida. The proprietors dispatched a new
governor, James Colleton, with whom local officials refused to cooperate. The desires
*

of the proprietors and the demands of the crown were in opposition to popular opinion,

6 M. Eugene Sirmans, “Politics in Colonial South Carolina: the Failure o f Proprietary Reform, 16821694,” The William and Mary Quarterly 3d series (Jan., 1966): 33.

especially on the issues o f suppressing pirate and Indian trades which had taken hold
in the colony and were generally viewed favorably. Some colonists believed that
Colleton overstepped the power afforded to him in the charter by banning the trades,
and when Colleton refused to recall the divided parliament in 1687, rhetoric of
tyrannical government rapidly spread. The Glorious Revolution provided the basis for
a series of more conservative uprisings: the colonists wanted to regain political power
in the current system, rather than establish a new political order. The result, for South
Carolina, was the expulsion of Colleton and an uneasy relationship between the
colonists, their local officials, and the proprietors for the following three decades.7
Official policy on the suppression of piracy shifted from rapid trials and
executions, as under Colleton in the 1680s, to tactics designed to promote long-term
stability. The War of Spanish Succession produced a glut of privateers, encouraged
and licensed by Queen Anne. But the war left the seaboard with a significant
lingering problem: many of the once-legitimate privateers turned pirate after the
Peace of Utrecht in 1713. The mass of unemployed sailors drove down wages paid by
merchants for shiphands, and competition rose even for the lowest paying jobs. The
privateers, turned out by the Royal Navy and disappointed by the conditions on
merchants vessels, continued to plunder the triangular trade shipping routes between
the Caribbean and the North American mainland, taking advantage of newly-obtained

7 Thomas Cooper, ed. Statutes at Large o f South Carolina. Vol. II (Columbia, S. C.: A. S. Johnston,
1837), 45.
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Spanish markets through the terms of the asiento, a British monopoly of the slave
o

trade to previously-closed Spanish markets in the wake of the Treaty of Utrecht.
Pardons issued to pirates after 1717 were designed to absorb as many
renegades back into society as possible. To this end the pardon procedure included a
provision that permitted reformed pirates to keep their treasure if they freely
renounced their prior rogue ways. British officials believed they could lure pirates
away from their volatile and dangerous profession with the promise of the ability to
settle down in the colonies with their ‘savings.’ A preventative measure directed
towards seamen accompanied this policy. The crown approved a sliding scale of
reward payments for bounty hunters bringing pirates back to mainland North America.
British encouragement of pirate hunting proved to be both a profitable opportunity for
industrious sailors and a safeguard against straight men turning to piracy. It was more
lucrative to work against the pirates than to become one.9
England viewed its responsibility to act against pirates as part of a global
effort. That piracy occurred on the seas and negatively influenced trade between
nations only slightly complicated the question of authority in the eyes of the vice
admiralty. “And the King of England hath not only an Empire and Sovereignty over
the British Sea, but also an undoubted Jurisdiction and Power, in concurrency with

8 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750. (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E.
Shaipe, Inc., 1998), 172.
9 Philip Gosse, The History o f Piracy {New York: Tudor, 1934), 316-24; Hanna, “The Pirate Nest”,
289-321.
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other Princes and States” to prosecute pirates, even “in the most remote Parts of the
World.”10
The English law’s specific definition of piracy also alluded to flexible
jurisdiction. The description of crimes considered piracy was straightforward, but an
important element of the definition was the location of the criminal activity. In order
to be considered piracy, the criminal act had to be “committed in or upon the Sea, or in
any other Haven, River, Creek, or Place where the Admiral or Admirals have or
pretend to have Power, Authority, or Jurisdiction.”11 Piratical activity in or around
English territories was a matter for England, and Parliament held hostage the right of
localities to operate trials against pirates. Colonial officials had to petition to try
pirates; when the petition was granted, strict instructions and trial procedures had to be
followed.
Piracy was almost always considered as a capital offense by the jury. A 1718
description of trial procedures for piracy even condones vigilantism, stating that “in
our Law they are terms Brutes, and Beasts of Prey; and that it is lawful for any one
that takes them, if they cannot with safety to themselves bring them under some
Government to be tried, to put them to Death.” 12 In the event that the captors did hand
the alleged pirates over to the government alive, the judge of the vice admiralty court
commissioned a grand jury to hear evidence on the charges. Once an indictment was
10 Tryals o f Major Stede Bonnet and Other Pirate. (London: Benjamin Crowse, 1719), xi.
11 South Carolina Court o f Vice-Admiralty, “O ct 30, 1718”, Records o f the South Carolina Court o f
Admirality 1716-1732. Parts 1-2, AB (London, 1719).
12 T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection o f State Trials and Proceedings fo r High Treason and Other
Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783 (London: T. C; Hansard, 1816),
1235.
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issued, the vice-admiralty court conducted a trial, often for a group of alleged pirates .
The court first acknowledged witnesses supporting the case against the defendants.
Any of the sitting members of the court could question the witnesses, after which the
accused were afforded the opportunity to question their accusers. Then, the court
directly questioned each alleged pirate.
Most of the alleged pirates denied either direct criminal activity or knowledge
of the piracy, or claimed the pirates forced them aboard by threat of death or slavery.
Sometimes this strategy was successful, but only when supported by the Judge and the
Attorney General. More often, claims of ignorance fell on deaf ears, as evidenced by .
this exchange between prisoner Thomas Carman and the Court.
Carman. As for what I did on board Capt. Thatch, I was forced, but when I
came to North Carolina, I would not have went on board, but Maj. Bonnet
shewed me the Act of Grace: and when I enter’d myself on board, it was to get
my Bread, I hopes to have went where I might have had Business; for when we
left Topsail-Inlet, I had not signed the Articles.
Ignatius Pell [witness for the King’s Evidence]. But you gave the Captain
your work that you would.
Carman. When I was left in the Sloop, I endeavoured to make my escape with
the Sloop.
Judge Trott. So, I find you wanted a Vessel of your own.
Carman. No, but to have got from them: but I could not.
Attorney General. This confirms what the King’s Evidence proves against
them.13
13 Tryals o f Major Stede Bonnet and Other Pirates, 16. In another installment o f the trial, the Jury found
Thomas Gerrard not guilty o f piracy after both a hostage and Judge Trott claimed “he was threaten’d to
be made a slave of; tho indeed he [had] better been made a slave than go a pirating”, and that he was
“faithful to his King and Country.” Jonathan Clarke and Rowland Sharpe also make successful claims
o f innocence supported by the Attorney General because “none o f the Evidence proves that he shared
any o f the Goods” the pirates stole; 31.

Thomas Carman and the seven other men tried along with him were condemned for
piracy in the second installment of South Carolina’s most famous piracy trial. Though
Stede Bonnet and his partner Edward Thatch, better known colloquially as
Blackbeard, later became figureheads of the Golden Age of Piracy in North America,
the particular connection between the two pirates and the port of Charleston proved
more important in the development of legal rhetoric and public memory surrounding
piracy.
Thatch and Bonnet, aside from assembling a flotilla under the black flag and
assuming a troubling presence for merchant vessels between South Carolina and
Barbados, had in 1718 delivered an assault on Charleston in the form of a hostage
crisis. As one eyewitness reported, after taking “five Prizes” off the bar of Charleston,
the pirates devised a plan to “dispose of the Vessels and Prisoners and being then in
want of Medicines, they resolved to demand a Chest from the Government, and detain
them till they were sent.” The pirates blockaded the Charleston harbor and sent one
hostage, Mr. Marks, and two representatives of the pirate crew to make an application
to the governor. The governor initially refused, upon which “the Pirates had
unanimously resolved to murder all the Prisoners, and bum their Prizes” in the harbor.
“The Pirates being too strong to cope with at the Time”, the governor acquiesced to
the pirates’ request for medicine, after which the pirates “hurried the Prisoners to their
Vessels the next Day, and made sail from this Coast.” Officials found the event so
bold and offensive that the Attorney General made a special plea in his opening

13

remarks for the Grand Jury to consider that “the Inhabitants of this Province have of
late, to their great Cost and Damages, felt the Evil of Piracy”, and further claimed that
the extortion by the pirates “was putting the Province under Contribution.”14
People in Charleston believed that instability attracted pirates, and many found
fault with the proprietors for the state of the province. A 1720 letter from an unknown
source implored the Crown to take over the colony, listing a number of social
grievances the author believed to be linked. South Carolina was under siege from
“negroes rising with a designe to destroy all the white people in the country and then
to take the towne”, “an increase dayly in slaves but decrease in white men”, men
“killed by the Indians to the Southward”, and with little protection, the author
expected they “shall now have more pyrates than ever.” He speculated that if the
colony came under royal direction, “doubtless Carolina will thrive again”, but under
the supervision of the proprietors “many of the best and richest inhabitants will leave
the country.”15
Another letter directly linked the government to the pirates, and indicates a
growing worry among colonists that official support of piracy might topple the
colonial economy and political structure. In a letter to the King, the Assembly of
South Carolina reported on the inability of the proprietors to govern. Specifically, the
authors expressed concern that the government proved incapable of protecting the
colonists because the officials were directly involved in facilitating violent events.

14 Tryals o f Major Stede Bonnet, 3-4.
15 Letter to Mr. Boone, June 24, 1720, sec. 125, in Cecil Headlam, ed., Calendar o f State Papers,
Colonial Series, America and West Indies 1720-1721 (afterwards noted CSPCS), 57-58.
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They indicted the government of North Carolina for allowing Thatch to commit
“several acts of piracy there in the very face of that Government”, noting that “several
parcels of pyratical goods were found in their govemours and secretarys custody.”
The proprietors of South Carolina, according to the letter, did nothing to get rid of the
pirate nest (as opposed to Virginia governor Alexander Spottswood), but “abandoned
the Government to evil Ministers and exposed us [the colonists] to ye ravages of most
barbarous enemys” which included not only pirates, but Indians and Spanish forces.16
The aftermath of Thatch’s execution and the crew’s trials was more than a
lingering public memory. The incident exposed critical weaknesses in the colony’s
ability to protect itself, and the trial demonstrated the willingness of both South
Carolina officials and the vice admiralty to put an end to piracy. Legal and procedural
changes reflected the greater need for a hard line on piratical activity. Perhaps the
largest departure from previous attempts to control piracy came in the form of an
.J

internal cleansing of ties to pirates and their goods. The pirate trade the South
Carolina colonists had fought to protect against Colleton was threatening stability as
colonists conspired with pirates to obtain goods at the expense of their shipping
industry. Governors in the continental colonies asked the crown for proclamations
permitting them to try both pirates and those colluding with pirates. In 1721
Parliament responded with a stronger bill to suppress piracy by holding accessories to
piracy criminally responsible. The definition of an accessory was broad and included
such activities as “trading with known pirates, or furnishing them with stores or
16 Petition o f the Council and Assembly o f the Settlements in South Carolina to the King, Feb. 2, 1720,
CSPCS 1720-1721, 333-337.
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ammunition, or fitting out any vessel for that purpose, or in any wise consulting,
combining, confederating, or corresponding with them.” Any of these charges could
result in a trial, with the colluder labeled a “pirate felon and robber.”
The new laws and corresponding enforcement proved effective in reducing
piracy in the Caribbean and off the mainland coast through the 1720s. The effort was
sustained by the support of “clergymen, royal officials, and publicists who sought
through sermons, proclamations, pamphlets, and the newspaper press to create an
image of the pirate that would legitimate his extermination.”18 The widespread
piratical activity off the North American coast became a problem shared by the
entirety of the colonies through systematic reprinting of pirate encounters. Some of
the articles depicted pirate attacks as almost inevitable, stressing the degree to which
pirate vessels effectively controlled high areas of trade traffic. One example detailed
the immense loss of cargo due to pirates. The article quoted a letter from an agent in
Kingston, Jamaica to a merchant in Charleston, noting that a snow which “had on
board for the Merchants of this Place, a great quantity of Goods, and considerable
parcels of Silver” was among “not less than six Sail of Vessels taken” by pirates as
they were “going to and coming from said Island [Jamaica].” The article notes that
the pirates intercepted “a considerable quantity of Silver” which was to be used to

17 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f England, IV (New York: W. E. Dean, 1832), 51;
Gosse, History o f Piracy, 316. A brief discussion o f the interplay between British, French, and Spanish
policies on privateering and piracy can be found in Anthony McFarlane, The British in the Americas,
1480-1815 (London: Longman, 1994), 128-132.
18 Rediker, Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 285.
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“purchase a load of Rice” from Charleston, one of South Carolina’s most important
commodities.19
The newspaper accounts also portrayed the piratical activity as a direct and
calculated assault on individuals, the colonies, and the crown. In the wake of Edward
Thatch’s patrol of the coast, The Boston News-Letter printed the story of William
Wyer, captain of Protestant Caesar, a trading vessel which was overtaken by Thatch
and his crew in the notorious Queen Anne’s Revenge. Wyer’s crew was so fearful of
the pirates that they refused to fight and handed over the ship; in a meeting with Wyer,
Thatch allegedly said he “was glad that he [Wyer] left his Ship, else his Men on Board
his Sloop would have done him Damage for fighting with them” before adding that he
“would bum his Ship because she belonged to Boston, adding he would bum all
Vessels belong to New England for Executing the six Pirates at Boston.”20 Thus the
Blackbeard incident became the trope of the Golden Age of piracy in South Carolina;
the pirates, the collaborators, and permissive governors became the enemies of the
colony and empire, and the upstanding officials, Royal Navy, and law-abiding colonist
their heroes.
Despite both the colonial government’s and the vice admiralty’s commitment
to eradicating the pirate problem and reordering the charter after the departure of the
proprietors between 1715 and 1720, peace did not always exist between the bodies. In
1723 the Privy Council responded to reports of “ill treatment” of the Judge of the Vice

19 “Charlestown, South-Carolina, Feb. 19”, New England Weekly Journal, Mar. 20, 1732, 2.
20 The Boston News-Letter, issue 693, Jul. 15,1717,2.
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Admiralty by Francis Nicholson, the governor, who also ignored the court’s
jurisdiction. The Privy Council demanded that “orders be sent to all Governors of
Plantations that at their Perrils they do not themselves Molest, or interrupt the Judges
and other Officers of the respective vice admiraltys”, but instead they should “do use
their utmost to Encourage and Support the aforesaid officers.. .in the Just and legall
Execution of their Duty.” The Privy Council concluded by stating that most of the
problems warranting complaint by the colonists fell under the jurisdiction of the vice
admiralty.

n t

The British officials were also concerned with what they identified as an
independent spirit in South Carolina. On August 5, 1724 Governor Nicholson wrote a
report to the Council of Trade and Plantations full of complaints against the colonists
and their political conduct. According to Nicholson, he “found that the Lower House
have very strangely acted (and in my humble opinion like Common Wealth men)
i

assuming to make resolutions without the consent of H.M Honble. Council or myself
nay even without advice and with submission to your Lords”, and the colonists were
“insisting on their old privilidges as they call it in ye Proprietours’ time some of which
I think very inconsistent with the King’s Government.”22 Nicholson’s account of the
colonists’ dissatisfaction with imperial intervention in their governmental proceedings
suggests that while the colonists had been anxious and insistent in getting rid of the

21 Acts o f the Privy Council o f England Vol III (London: Authority o f the Lords Commissioners, 1966),
57-58.
22 Governor Nicholson to the Council o f Trade and Plantations, Aug. 5, 1724, CSPCS1724-1725, 198.
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proprietorship, they were not fully prepared to accept the realities of operating in a
royal colony.
Even with the Privy Council’s decision to uphold the power of the vice
admiralty in spite of complaints, the relationship between the vice admiralty,
Charleston residents, and perpetrators of maritime crime remained complicated. The
unifying moment of the piracy crackdown was gone, and a system of conditional
permission and convoluted social attitudes toward privateering, piracy, and plunder
replaced it. The Navy could not afford to stop the practice of privateering in wartime,
even at the risk of another destructive rise of piracy. Similarly, the Charleston
blockade was not the representative experience of the relationship between South
Carolinians and pirates - the colonists had opposed Colleton’s bullion ban not two
decades before. The needs of the pirates were not always in direct contrast to the
needs of the colonists; often, the pirates helped support the local economy with hard
currency, and the colonists kept the pirates provisioned at port. Thus for all three
groups, the space between the law and the demands of reality was sometimes changing
and often contested.
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Chapter Two: Coin, Councilors, and Courts in Political Contest

The British first made legal provisions for vice admiralty courts in South
Carolina in 1696. One early act required all vessels exchanging goods in colonial
ports to carry a valid register. Two individuals were responsible for inspecting
registers and noting cargo: a naval officer affiliated with the vice-admiralty, and a
collector, appointed by local officials. Both were required to submit reports to the
custom commissioners in London, and both parties’ signatures were required in the
secretary’s book. This arrangement became the norm for officials dealing with the
enforcement of port regulations. Parliament handed down the law, the colonial
officials oversaw the law’s application, the vice admiralty court was in place for
enforcement, and some combination of crown appointees and local selectmen
determined who would go before the court, and who would not.23
At the turn of the century, colonial officials and the vice admiralty focused
together on eradicating the pirate problem, and the presence of the Royal Navy
warships, which patrolled the coast, gave the vice admiralty court a boost of power.
The colonists welcomed the presence of the warships, a visible sign of security. If the
colonial officials were mostly under the thumb of the crown, the official appointees’
influence was dwarfed by the empowered and popular court. After the boom in piracy

23 Steven L. Snell, Courts o f Admiralty and the Common Law: Origins o f the American Experiment in
Concurrent Jurisdiction. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 143-147.

20

trials in the 1720s, mechanisms for controlling and apprehending pirates shifted back
toward crown-approved pardons.
English law made specific prescriptions for jurisprudence in the colonies. The
colonial legal system relied on two overarching concepts: repugnancy and divergence.
Colonial statutes could diverge from English law to accommodate unique needs, but
the colony’s laws must be in the spirit of, and in no way repugnant to, English law.
This idea was built into the very foundations of the colonies, and their laws. The 1629
patent for Carolina dictates that the laws should “be consonant to reason and not
repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be) agreeable”, and the 1663
charter had nearly identical language.24 The repugnancy and divergence principles
were significant because their codification resulted in the legal acknowledgment of
distinct colonial needs. In turn, that provision empowered colonial officials to develop
a legal system instead of directly transplanting an existing one. Over the first half of
the eighteenth century, colonists’ understanding of how the law should be applied
grew more complicated; even when the laws were not repugnant to those of England,
colonists’ reaction to legal constraints, especially in the case of booty, often were.
Plunder must be considered as an element of Charleston’s economy. Not only
did Charleston’s long history with piracy leave room for plunder trade, bullion played
a divisive financial and political role in South Carolina affairs. Immediately following
the piracy crackdown, South Carolina experienced economic growth which promoted

24 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2004), 215.
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financial and political organization around a plantation production and shipping
»

distribution system. The rise of plantations and Charleston’s booming shipping power
impacted the relationship between the colonists and various governing boards. With
the 1720 takeover of the colony by Britain from the failed proprietorship, the Board of
Trade assumed control of the South Carolina council. These councilors were
responsible for local governance, as well as maintaining correspondence with London.
The council consisted of twelve men, all appointed, to be drawn from the suggestions
of the governor and the Board’s knowledge of the candidates’ social and moral
standing. The first appointees were placemen, lawyers, and visiting investors from
London, with two thirds being staunch supporters of the rebellion and one third being
proprietary holdovers. The Board hoped that allowing representation for the factions
would create a council better suited to dealing with the aftermath of the power
transfer.
Immediately the council challenged issues of jurisdiction in the colony. In his
)

1721 report, Francis Yonge, clerk of the Council of South Carolina, told the Council
of Trade and Plantations that much of the council’s time had “been taken up in
disputes and settling the Custom House and Court of Admty. Affairs, that the Acts of
Trade may be duely observed” in order to avoid both courts from “setting up an
independant jurisdiction and power from that of the Government.” Yonge then
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credited Governor Nicholson with “a perfect tranquility owing to ye prudent
administration” in the colony.

9<

The planters and merchants amassed great political capital relatively quickly.
The most powerful planter families had ties to each other by blood and marriage, and
supplied a large number of colonial officials, including multiple governors. The
merchant elites were familiar to the Board of Trade by their business relationships
with London partners and investors. In the second round of selections, the Board
acknowledged the local influence of these groups by replacing the outgoing investors
and placemen largely with merchants and planters. The Board invested power and
relative independence to its selections, the most prominent, and often the most wealthy
men of the colony.
The South Carolina council only continued to gain local power and prestige
through the 1720s. The governors deferred to the council, and in one case the council
was illicitly permitted to elect its own president and select replacement councilors
without gubernatorial oversight. The Board of Trade, at once obsessed and unable to
deal with rising factionalism on the subject of currency, made several critical missteps
in handling the paper money debates in the 1720s. First siding with a strict antiemission hard money faction, the Board came under fire from pro-paper and more
moderate members of the provincial government. Producers and factors railed against
the Board’s refusal to make any headway in alleviating the currency shortage.

25 Francis Yonge to the Council o f Trade and Plantations, Oct 28, 1721, CSPCS1721 sec. 702, pg. 479.
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The colonial government took matters into their own hands. In November of
1729 Benjamin Whitaker wrote a letter to the Council of Trade and Plantations to
report on new developments in the currency crisis. Whitaker alleged that Arthur
Middleton, the president of South Carolina, “contrary to the express orders of his late
Majesty”, had “issues 30,000 in paper bills of credit (which by law ought to have been
sunk) whereby the value of the said bills are greatly lessed; and the training people of
Great Britain much injured.” Whitaker expressed corlcem for the province more
generally, stating that “H.M. subjects in Carolina have to fear from a state of anarchy
and confusion to which they are now very near reduc’d”, a condition only worsened
by Middleton’s “diverse.. .acts highly injurious to H.M. prerogative.”26
Losing the battle on both paper money and the authority over it, the Board
reversed position in 1729 and lent support to a moderate pro-emission council
plurality. The Board then removed the reactionary hard money faction and the radical
paper money advocates from the council. Though many colonists supported the 1729
decision on currency, the subsequent ousting of the political opponents left some
deeply nervous of the Board’s political designs on local government.
By 1730, the constant clash of the currency debates and the rise of local
production and distribution provided the local government, the merchants and the
planters, with considerable power. The provincial government was designed to relay
English law to the colonists. This worked when the local government was either under
the thumb or in agreement with those giving the orders from London. Throughout the
26 Benjamin Whitaker to the Council o f Trade and Plantations, Nov. 13, 1729, CSPCS1729, 240-241.
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1730s, those requirements grew less applicable to the situation in South Carolina, and
especially in Charleston. The planters and merchants’ concerns revolved around the
tangible needs of the colony. The Board of Trade’s policy switch on currency
emission demonstrated the power of the planter and merchant bloc. The vice
admiralty had a similarly tenuous relationship with local authorities. The piracy
crackdown had worked only because the officials delivered the pirates to the court.
Local authorities needed approval of England’s institutions in order to enforce their
policy, but the enforcing institutions were dependent on the authorities for support and
compliance.

97

The relationship began to unravel in the 1730s. As acknowledged by scholars
of the earlier period, Charleston had a set of unique issues that impacted public
response to the law. The ongoing threat of Spanish, French, and Native American
attack put colonists on the defensive, desperately trying to prove their loyalty to the
crown and their commitment to stabilizing the colony. The colonists, for all their
effort, were not pleased with the support they received from the imperial bodies in
South Carolina. The continued ineffectualness of the Lords Proprietors and a
growing, disgruntled upper-middle class left a legacy of political struggle in the
southern shipping center.
During the decline in piracy in the 1720s, Charleston was a mid-sized town
with a population of roughly 3,000. Still, Charleston handled virtually all trade in

27 Mary Sarah Bilder provides definitions and context for the competing legal approaches o f repugnancy
and divergence in Rhode Island in Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution, 40-42.
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South Carolina’s cash crops through a system of contracting.28 Charleston merchants
acted as middlemen between the plantation owners producing rice and the British
buyers. South Carolina’s cash crop economy and British trade policies left the colony
completely dependent on importation for manufactured items. It then follows that
preserving the budding economic prosperity of Charleston, and the import-export
pattern that supported the colony, was a priority of officials and colonists alike.
Merchants involved in the export trade flocked to the port to collect contracts for rice
and indigo. Charleston merchants also oversaw the steadily increasing import trade,
though it was at their own risk. Merchants both extended and operated under lines of
credit in a colony notorious for difficult debt-collecting.

90

The lack of colonial merchant authority in the trade illuminates how heavily
reliant South Carolina was on England, not only for dry goods, but also for direct
investment and trade governance. As Britain strengthened a monopoly in South
Carolina’s manufacture import trade, British merchants transferred more fiscal
responsibility on the local merchants. Factors in South Carolina received goods on
long-term credit, which was especially critical for those engaged in the slave trade,
and they accrued large debts to London capital providers.
This was sustainable so long as trade was reliable. The tipping point came
when the effects of the 1720s separation of dry goods and staple trade diverted

28 R. C. Nash, “The Organization o f Trade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South
Carolina, 1670-1775” in Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution o f Colonial South Carolina’s
Plantation System, Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and Randy J. Sparks, eds. (Columbia, S.C.:
University o f South Carolina Press, 2001), 74-107.
29 Ibid., 85.
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commodity dealing from London to other ports. Export merchants no longer enjoyed
credit exchanges with London, and the shift resulted in the English merchants being
freed from their financial obligations. Instead, the South Carolina agents of English
merchants had to come up with the resources to finance the trade. Heavily burdened,
the Charleston factors attempted to guarantee some of their expenses by extracting
bills of exchange from planters, which appears to have functioned for a time as an
informal credit exchange. But by the end of the 1730s many planters, contractors and
import factors were severely indebted to London, and to each other. When commodity
prices collapsed in 1739 at the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession, all groups
fell under tremendous pressure to inflate prices, continue shipping, and most
importantly, avoid crumbling under the debt.
An important social issue in South Carolina further tested Charleston residents’
trust in British governance. Slavery was long prevalent in the colony, but the urban
slavery of Charleston was a specialized system. White residents of the town
fluctuated between strong confidence and uneasiness. Charleston slavery was primary
rent-seeking; slaves were trained in a skill, then hired out for the financial benefit of
the master. But Charleston was not geographically far from the large-scale
agricultural slavery so characteristic of southern plantations. Early laws on the subject
provided little more than a definition of slavery, which stipulated that those of African
descent and Native Americans could be made slaves for life and their children would
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be bom into slavery. As the slave population increased with the success of laborintensive rice, so too did the debates on legislation for the slave society.
Ongoing marronage and insurrection in the Caribbean concerned South
Carolinians. They were well aware of the 1733 revolt on Danish St. John, in which
slaves overtook and held estates in the northern part of the island for several months
until French ships from Martinique put down the rebellion. In those months, planter
families fled to neighboring St. Thomas and also to St. Croix. The 1733 revolt was a
tme attempt at a takeover: slaves murdered white families, then took possession of the
fields with the hope of reviving production. That the slaves sought to capture and run
plantations heightened fear in Charleston’s surrounding rice regions. Slave
conspiracies unveiled in Antigua and the Bahamas provided more evidence of the
potential danger slaves might possess to South Carolina.

^

1

The Jamaican situation exposed another, more insidious danger. Since the
institution of slavery on the island, maroon communities established in the forested
hills of the island attracted mnaways. The maroons, still dependent on plantations for
goods, raided nearby farms and houses, and white planters accused them of
encouraging mass runaway attempts. The communities bordering the maroon
settlements implored the local officials to disperse the maroons. The First Maroon
War began in 1731, but the British had little luck in finding and fighting the maroons.
30 Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono
Rebellion (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 196-200.
31 David Barry Gaspar, Bondsmen and Rebels: a Study o f Master-Slave Relations in Antigua.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); David Barry Gaspar, “The Antigua Slave
Conspiracy o f 1736: A Case Study o f the Origins o f Collective Resistance,” William and Mary
Quarterly 3rd ser., 35 no. 2 (Apr. 1978): 308-323.
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Conflict continued until 1739, when the Captain General negotiated a treaty with the
maroons. The terms of the treaty granted acreage and freedom to the maroons in
exchange for their work as bounty hunters of runaway slaves. The treaty served the
needs of the community, which no longer feared theft of goods and slaves by the
maroons. The Jamaican Council wrote an open letter, published in Boston and then
reprinted, declaring that the “the Council of Island of Jamaica, do with the utmost
Satisfaction congratulate your Excellency upon the late successful Expedition against
the Negroes in Rebellion, and the Treaty so happily concluded with them.”32
In South Carolina, where permanent marronage had never taken hold but
remained a perceived threat among white residents, the crown’s willingness to accept
a treaty which guaranteed rebellious runaway slaves their freedom was no matter for
celebration. In granting the maroons freedom, the Jamaican governor had essentially
taken property from the citizens. More seriously, the military expedition against the
maroons had failed, and instead of eliminating the maroon threat, the government
pacified the runaways by gifting land. Finally, the treaty usurped local control of the
slave population. The British saw the maroons as guerilla fighters; South Carolinians
saw them as someone’s incorrigible missing property. As South Carolina slaveholders
debated how to handle the volume of slaves attempting to run to St. Augustine, the
Maroon Treaty dealt a blow to their confidence in British assistance in regulating the
matter.

32Kenneth M. Bilby, True-Born Maroons (Gainesville: University o f Florida Press, 2008); “Behalf o f
the Inhabitants o f the Island o f Jamaica”, Boston Evening Post. June 11, 1739, 1.
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In 1739, a slave insurrection at Stono brought home to Charleston what has
been described as “a decade of slave unrest throughout the New World plantation
complex.” On the ninth of September, a group of twenty slaves staged an uprising
roughly twenty miles from Charleston. The active revolt lasted 48 hours, at the end of
which forty whites and most of the slaves involved were dead, but the event had
enormous ramifications in the legal arena. What Philip D. Morgan observed as
“oscillat[ion] between protracted stretches of near-complacency and brief spasms of
paranoia” at the threat of insurrection turned to proactive legislation in the wake of
Stono.33
Charleston’s citizens were long locked in vigorous debates over who
controlled slaves, masters or the government. The populace had for decades been split
on matter of the Security Act, which required white men to carry guns on Sunday to
police slave activity during free hours. The issue of slaves forming cabals while their
masters were in church was one of substantial discussion since the mid 1720s, but the
law had never been consistently enforced due to widespread opposition: South
Carolinians balked at a law which allowed others to police their slaves and demanded
their action. After Stono, the 1740 Negro Act strengthened the existing Security Act,
but in further regulating slave movements and activity the Act diminished the power
of the master. Slaves were to be supervised during travel and work, and were
forbidden to learn to write or carry weapons. Masters were no longer permitted to
manumit their slaves. Only the government could approve manumission. This change
33 Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and
Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1998), 239.
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meant that in order to secure freedom, a slave had to run away and disappear, petition
the government, or arrange to purchase their freedom, which was upheld through
deeds of gift.34
From an urban slave’s perspective, restricted manumission dealt a large blow
to their work system. Masters often permitted urban slaves to keep a portion of their
wages, or if not, to hire themselves out on their free time. In some cases urban slavery
resembled indenture, with the master willing to negotiate freedom in exchange for a
number of years or amount of income earned. Urban slaves had access to goods and
money, and under some circumstances such a slave could hope to save enough money
to purchase his or his family’s freedom. If the slaves could not travel alone or work
unsupervised, their ability to make their own income decreased substantially. Under
these new laws, an opportunity for freedom through privateering emerged.
Within Charleston, many slaves had skills that were useful aboard a ship, and
some were routinely hired out as shiphands on merchant vessels. This was a
particularly lucrative situation for a master, since merchants often paid a lump sum for
the labor of a slave sailor.35 The slave couldn’t hope to see much personal profit for
working on the merchant vessel, but during wartime, when crews turned privateers, a
slave might see one prize that could afford him his freedom.
For those with an acknowledged claim to a prize, booty or future plunder was a
viable commodity in the economy. Prior to 1740, informal credit exchanges were
34 Wood, Black Majority, 103.
35W. Jeffrey Bolster, Blackjacks: African American Seamen in the Age o f Sail (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1997), 20, 138.
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standard procedure for many colonists to guarantee some of their cargo or cover
overhead costs of outfitting ships. In a common style of power of attorney document,
mariner Francis Surley appointed “Joseph Shute of Charles Town in the Province
Aforesaid Merchant to be our true and Lawfull Agent & Attorney for us & in our
behalf to do & transact all Matters & things” related to their venture. What made this
document out of the ordinary was the fact that Surley named Shute the beneficiary of
any “Lawfull Prize” they captured.
The word “prize” usually referred to a captured ship, while cargo items fell
under the inclusive term “plunder”. This distinction is present in testimonies and
deeds from Charleston. In an affidavit dated March 4, 1745, Captain William Dunbar
reported “a Spanish ship Bahama & Esperance lately seized and taken on the High
Seas as lawfull prize”.

'xn

The remainder of the affidavit contains Dunbar’s testimony

that the Spanish ship intended to take his sloop of war as a prize and his crew
responded to the attack - a self-defense argument which protected Dunbar and his
crew against allegation of piracy.
By the 1740s the late Golden Age hysteria over piracy had dulled, but the War
of Austrian Succession created a political situation that from the ocean resembled the
War of the Spanish Succession three decades earlier. Merchants, sailors, servants, and
debtors took to the sea on their own accord in hopes of turning a profit. The mariners
of Charleston had long contended with the threat of French and Spanish hostility in the

36 Surley, Francis. Power o f Attorney Contract. June 29, 1745. South Carolina Department o f Archives
and History (afterwards noted as SCDAH), Columbia S. C.
37 Affidavit o f William Dunbar, Mar. 4, 1745. SCDAH.
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Caribbean. Though historians cannot determine the individual motivations for
knowingly breaking the law to “go on the account” in the 1740s, Charleston’s
documents provide two insights into how maritime crime affected the city. Mariners
intended to and did use plundered goods to reduce their debt and in some cases win
their freedom from bondage. Secondly, the presence of records of prize and plunder
in court documents indicate that the colonial authorities were recognized or even
'I Q

tolerated these men’s use of plunder outside the bounds of the vice admiralty court.
During times of war, British officials openly encouraged the plundering of
enemies. This was no less true for the Austrian conflict as it had been in the War of
Spanish Succession, but the economic situation of the colonies created divides in
policy and a heightened sense of desperation in Charleston. A period of serious
depreciation ended in 1731, and concerns in the legislature over economic tensions
with Britain led to a currency act, passed in 1736, which called for the balancing of the
account with Britain and a limit on the circulation of paper money. In an attempt to
encourage use of specie, the legislature approved a discount on import duties.
Colonial merchants expressed concerns over the prevalence of paper notes, but the
Board of Trade refused to grant petitions for an increase in paper money, due to fears
of another round of depreciation.

38 Deposition o f John Schermerhome regarding a Standoff with a Spanish ship, Aug. 23, 1745. SCDAH.
39 Richard M. Jellison, “Antecedents o f the South Carolina Currency Acts o f 1736 and 1746”, The
William and Mary Quarterly 3rd series (Oct., 1959), 556-67. This article details the struggle between
colonial merchants who advocated for paper money and the crown’s concerns over securing debt
payments. Kenneth Morgan, “The Organization o f the Colonial American Rice Trade”, The William
and Mary Quarterly 3rd series (Jul., 1995), 433-52, esp. 445. Morgan focuses on the impact o f specie
on trade, specifically the crises stemming from credit refusals.
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Responding to the boom in privateering, the Privy Council sent uniform
instructions to the governors of their colonies to streamline procedures. In September
o f 1741 the governors received “an Alteration in the Instructions formerly given to the
said Governors concerning the Colours to be worn by all Ships to whom the said
Governors shall grant Private Commissions or Letters of Marque or Reprizal”, the
point of which was to “make the same conformable to those given by his Majesty’s
Commissioners.” A 1745 addendum forbade “Men of War or Privateers ransoming
prisoners or ships” and included instructions for the governors to “see that all
Privateers send their Journals regularly to the Secretary of the Admiralty.”40
By regulating privateers and mainstreaming policies throughout the colonies,
the Admiralty hoped to avoid a repeat of the post-War of Spanish Succession piracy
epidemic. The Admiralty also wished to strengthen condemnation procedures in the
vice admiralty courts. With increased regulation of privateering came concerns of
authoritarian abuse. Two observable forms of resistance to the vice admiralty court
policies emerged. Firstly, the colonists worked within the legal system to challenge
jurisdiction and interpretation of the laws. In doing so, they used appeals to the Privy
Council and political maneuvering within their own governmental bodies to try and
reduce the vice admiralty court’s power. The second method of resistance could be
termed non-participation in vice admiralty court proceedings. Here, the colonists
simply bypassed the entire condemnation process. These methods were mutually
reinforcing. The colonial officials could challenge the vice admiralty court in the legal

40 Acts o f the Privy Council o f England Vol. Ill, 814.

realm because they had the support of the populace, and individual colonists could
engage in non-participation because the officials were complicit in their resistance.
South Carolina’s colonists worried that the vice admiralty was manipulating
legislation for its own favor at the expense of the, privateers. A report in the Commons
Journal makes note of a petition filed by Thomas Frankland on behalf of the captors of
the French ship La Conception. The privateers followed procedure for the
condemnation of La Conception, which “together with her Guns, Tackle, Furniture
and Apparel, and also the Moneys, Effects and other Things taken and seized In her”
was processed as a “lawful Prize” by the vice admiralty court. The inventory of the
ship included cocoa nuts and raw animal hides, two items which warranted a duty. 41
Frankland argued that the law was intended to permit the collection of duties
on cocoa or hides “imported in a mercantile Way” as opposed to that obtained as a
prize. In submitting his petition, Frankland implored “his Excellency and their
Honours.. .to explain the Intention of the aforesaid Act”. Frankland included a
charged suggestion, that if prizes were subject to duty, “then for the Encouragement of
Capors of Prizes to bring them into this Port the said Duties may be remitted”.42
In addition to suspicion over the vice admiralty court’s enforcement of import
duties, colonists clashed with the court again on the matter of service fees. The South
Carolina House of Commons decided to press the issue of authority over vice
admiralty court fees by appointing a council to review the law and ask for
41 South Carolina General Assembly, The Journal o f the Commons House o f Assembly, Nov. 14, 1751Oct. 7, 1752 (Columbia, S. C.: Historical Commission o f South Carolina, 1951), 300.
42 Ibid.
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clarification. The council had two goals, “to enquire whether any Act hath been made
by the Parliament of Great Britain for ascertaining the Fees of the Judge and other
Officers of the Court of Vice Admiralty with respect to the condemnation of Prizes”,
and “consider and report to the House some effectual Method for reducing the
exorbitant Fees which are taken by that Court in this Province.”43 Unfortunately for
those hoping the Assembly might wrest control of the fee scale, the committee
invoked the repugnancy principle in concluding that “an Act of Parliament concerning
the condemnation of Prizes ought to be a Rule to the Court of Vice Admiralty in this
Province, and that no Act of the General Assembly of this Province ought to operate
against it. «44
•

At times the conflict with the vice admiralty court had a very direct impact on
the everyday lives of Charleston residents. As late as 1746 the court conducted
business in a private home of a Charleston resident. Thomas Blythe submitted a
petition to either recoup costs exceeding the one hundred pounds allotted to him
yearly or have the court’s proceedings moved to another location altogether. Blythe
claimed that he was “put to great Inconvenience” for having to provide multiple rooms
and candles for the evening meetings of three separate courts.45
Unable to influence the fees, the location, or the economic agenda of the vice
admiralty court through legal means, some colonists opted to employ a different
strategy of influence: ignoring the court and navigating alternative paths to securing
43 South Carolina General Assembly, The Journal o f the Commons House o f Assembly, Nov. 21, 1752Sep. 6, 1754 (Columbia, S. C.: Historical Commission o f South Carolina, 1989), 24.
44 Ibid., 37.
45 Ibid., 74

36

and using booty. This option was especially appealing given the economic clime.
Specie from prizes was necessary to combat the staggering debt of the colony, and the
Charleston merchants were often at the bottom of the debt chain.
The poorer mariners and factors were indebted to Charleston merchants and
contractors, but their lenders were also indebted to capital firms in London. When
London firms pressured colonial lenders for payments, the lenders desperately
attempted to collect from the factors. Unable to produce coinage, mariners began to
include their lenders as beneficiaries in their wills or including promissory notes, and
the term “Merchant Attorney” is prevalent in deeds, signifying that local lenders
served as executors and held powers of attorney.46
Because the status of a debtor and lender brought informal agreements into the
formal legal arena, officials used deeds to open new avenues of securing or pursuing
money, be it legally obtained or otherwise. In a bond signed in Jamaica and sent to
Charleston for affirmation, James Ramadge guaranteed that if “10 pounds and 17
pounds of Jamaica money are in fact not paid by the said Captain Gordon to the said
Dallas as the same are charged then I will pay or cause to be paid to the sum of 27
pounds money of Jamaica” to settle a dispute between John Gordon, captain of
Ramadge’s schooner, and Robert Dallas and Joseph Whitfield over the capture of a
prize ship. Instead of bringing the matter before the vice admiralty court for a

46 Power o f Attorney document o f John Ferguson, Oct. 25,1742. SCDAH.
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decision, Ramadge chose to mediate and relied upon the justice of the peace to make
the agreement legally binding.47
Some seamen with plunder could not afford to take chances with the vice
admiralty court because more than a bit of money was at stake. Another effect of
increased plunder trade was the use of booty as, or in lieu of, valued goods in the
colonial economy. In the 1745 case of Thomas Jolly, the indentured servant of Joseph
Robinson, freedom would elude him if he could not maintain possession of the
plunder. Jolly was put to work as a foremastman on a snow bound for the Caribbean;
the snow engaged in a privateering expedition off of Jamaica. Upon his return, Jolly
found that his master had died, and decided to offer his share of the loot from French
prizes to Robinson’s widow in exchange for release from his indenture. In a deed of
gift Jolly reported that “for consideration of the said Joan Robinson cancelling and
Delivering up to me the said Thomas Jolly the herein before indenture” he would pay
the remainder of his term with “the French ships and their loading and cargoes and my
Share and portion of the Money arising by and from”.48 Joan Robinson accepted the
offer and Jolly was released from servitude. Going on the account afforded Jolly the
savings he needed to purchase his freedom, and utilizing allied colonial officials to
make the exchange guaranteed the transaction.
Thomas Jolly’s ability to buy his indenture reflects a shift in attitudes towards
labor in the 1740s. By this period virtually all willing indentures, as Jolly was, were

47 Bond issued by John Ramadge in Kingston Parish, Jamaica. Aug. 20, 1748. SCDAH.
48 Deed o f Gift from Thomas Jolly to Joan Robinson. Jun. 22, 1745. SCDAH.
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skilled workers from England serving indentures of four to six years upon arrival in
the colonies. This development is markedly different than the indentured servitude of
the previous century, which involved mainly unskilled workers employed in
agricultural labor who could be held in extended sentences. It is also reflective of
Charleston’s urban, rent-seeking system of indentured and slave labor, where laborers
were hired out by their masters for money. Jolly fit the portrait of the average mariner
of the day: poor, possessing enough skills for his master to hire him out but deprived
of the opportunity to purchase his freedom directly. Jolly was able to take advantage
o f a system that had a tradition of equating indentured labor with money, but only
because he chose to make arrangements for his freedom in the quasi-legal grey zone.
Jolly reappears in the colonial records once again after securing his freedom, when he
submitted a petition for a land-grant in nearby Colleton County.49 Thomas Jolly
arrived in South Carolina a bound servant and died a landholder.
Slaves working the ship decks took advantage of the opportunities afforded by
privateering. One such man was Benjamin Elden. Elden was a black man of
ambiguous status aboard a vessel called the Pearl out of Charleston, when Spanish
privateers took him captive off the coast of St. Augustine. Elden, along with Robert
Pratt and William Maxwell, escaped to Port Royal, where Pratt and Maxwell gave
testimony to the Justice of the Peace that Elden had helped them survive the ordeal
and gave their word he was a free man. The Justice of the Peace issued a statement to
the governor and Judge of the Vice Admiralty, declaring that “Benjamin Eldin [sic] a

49 Plat for 100 Acres to Thomas Jolly, Sep. 30, 1768, SCDAH.
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Negro Man is a Free M an.. .and not the Slave of any one within this said Majesty’s
Dominions”.50 Regardless of whether Elden was free before the incident, his actions
earned him the respect of his white crewmates, and the corresponding testimony
afforded him greater protection against enslavement in the Caribbean.
Scholars have written extensively on the social dynamics of those engaged in
privateering and piracy. Privateers historically had some maritime training or
practical skill that enabled them to work aboard ships. In the 1720s the demographic
shifted, as many wealthier privateers accepted pardons and assimilated back into
society. Poorer privateers had fewer options. Some were runaway slaves, or slaves
hired out to the ships by their masters, and the prospect of returning to slavery inspired
these individuals to continue pirating.51 Others were men pressed into service off of
captured merchant vessels who discovered some degree of increased freedom or social
mobility within the pirate crew. Even those pressed from the navy sometimes opted to
remain, as conditions were sometimes preferable aboard the privateering vessel.
Excepting Africans seized as cargo by some pirates, pressed members of the crew had
a say in group decisions and claimed a cut of the lucrative prizes.52

50 Correspondence between John Dart and Janies Glen, July 3, 1747. SCDAH.
51 Bolster, Black Jacks, 137-39.
52 Rediker, Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 260-68, appendix C l. Rediker’s table o f merchant shipping
wages from 1730-1750 demonstrates the significant increase in merchant wages throughout the 1740s.
Rediker argues, and Admiralty Court records verify, that some o f this increase is due to the destruction
o f shipping competition through privateering. Rediker uses these statistics to argue that merchant ships
were also involved in privateering; in this paper they are more useful in providing evidence for
continued demand for mariners in the time period.
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The privateering demographics in 1740 skewed towards the poorer sailors for
two major reasons. Jobs aboard merchant vessels were plentiful in the shipping boom,
and an influx of mariners into Charleston resulted in a prime market for privateers.
Secondly, the indebted poor were willing to enter the dangerous profession of
privateering for the chance to pay their debts and secure their business or land. The
latter issue demarcates the 1740s situation from the post-Spanish Succession piracy
boom. The economic conditions in South Carolina coupled with the Austrian conflict
afforded poor privateers the opportunity to make some money through capturing
prizes with little chance of government action against them.
A combination of local developments and international conflicts set the stage
for a resurgence in plunder trade in Charleston. The issue of privateering brought
local economic pressures to the surface. With the pre-war debt touching most of the
domestic economy, upper and lower classes alike looked to the black market to
provide financial relief. Just as Thomas Jolly saw privateering, and pirating booty, as
a mechanism for obtaining freedom, so too did Mrs. Robinson view it as a method for
obtaining much-needed specie. Charleston’s two most pervasive points of debate,
economic depression and unfree labor, were resolved between these two parties.
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Conclusion: Competing Definitions, Competing Authorities

Whether Thomas Jolly and Mrs. Robinson violated the law in their agreement
would depend on which law, and which enforcement institution, was involved,
invoked, and respected. The colonial officials saw nothing wrong with the
transaction: Jolly had simply bought out his indenture, fulfilling the terms of the
contract, and Mrs. Robinson received due value in exchange for the loss of her
laborer. The vice admiralty could have had both parties on trial, for the booty Jolly
exchanged for his freedom had not been processed through the proper channels as
outlined by maritime law, and statutes afforded the court the ability to charge Mrs.
Robinson as a conspirator.
During the War of Austrian Succession, the vice admiralty continued to
actively condemn prizes and distributed plunder according to regulation. The typical
register of a ship brought before the vice-admiralty court contained the name, size, and
weight of the ship, the cargo, and listed the owners and masters of the ship.
Considering the regulations, it is clear why men like Jolly, low-ranking and desperate,
preferred to section off the booty before, or instead of, the vice-admiralty court
division.
Still, Jolly and men like him didn’t stash, hide, or lie about the origins of the
plunder. Jolly involved local officials in negotiating the payoff to Mrs. Robinson.
Similarly, John Ferguson explicitly stated in a will that his investor was entitled to his
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plunder. Colonial authorities were complicit in the plunder trade. Instances such as
the testimony of Robert Pratt and William Maxwell, and William Dunbar’s selfdefense claims, suggest that the vice admiralty court still had jurisdiction, and
theoretical ability, to adjudicate these cases, and that colonists were aware of their
authority.
“Aware o f ’ and “accepting o f ’ proved far apart in the backroom dealings in
plunder in Charleston, and on the floor of the Commons House. Charleston residents
consistently challenged the authority of the vice admiralty court between 1720 and
1755, but they were not in a state of revolutionary rebellion. The steady string of
appeals to the Privy Council and petitions to Parliament suggest that the colonists
hoped for an internal remedy to their problems with the vice admiralty court. But
sustained disdain for the court broke down its practical authority, while panic over
economic depression and slave revolts led Charleston to question imperial interests in
what they considered their own affairs. The court had alienated local residents and
Parliament had not intervened on behalf of the colonists.
The combined effect of internal crisis and colonial-imperial tension was a grey
zone in which colonial politicians could assert practical control and privateers could
pirate goods. Instead of challenging the laws on the divergence principle, politicians
and privateers avoided the court altogether. The extralegal space in which Thomas
Jolly and Benjamin Elden operated was an opportunity fixed by domestic and
international conflict, and sustained by popular and local official support.
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London learned from the conflicting opinions of the major legal bodies during
the War of Austrian Succession. By the time the Seven Years War broke out in 1756,
the vice admiralty satellite courts received an effective ally in the appointed prize
agents, who also ordered and oversaw aggressive vessel registration within the ports.
Colonial officials were supportive of these strategies; in their eyes, finally Parliament
had sent parties to assist and report on the vice admiralty courts. This new practice
became so entrenched in maritime governance proceedings that the colonists would
employ a nearly identical one against the British during the American Revolution.
i

Colonial complicity with British imperial institutions was situational in
Charleston. In the first half of the eighteenth century, local government enjoyed the
respect of its citizens during the drive toward stability. Faced with prolonged
economic and political unrest, the constituency grew increasingly skeptical of British
understanding of their interests and situations. From this dissatisfaction sprouted
contests for authority. Charleston’s citizens were always willing to utilize proper
chains of communication to voice their complaints, but they were also prepared to
follow a different authority, that of the planter-merchant bloc which supported locallypopular but imperially-forbidden policies relating to trade, money, and security. The
vice admiralty court could not compete in the cycle of practicing power. The bloc had
earned the authority to override the word of the law, and by permitting technicallyillegal activity, strengthened their popularity and, in turn, authority. The power of the
local governance lay in its participants’ ability to open and close windows of
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opportunity strategically, taking action when their political needs and public demand
aligned against the Crown’s wishes and in favor of divergence.
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